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Court

,/or the Court, as for

society at large, this was
era of enormous turmoil and
nsformation. Indeed, I believe
it was "The Crucible of the
Modem Constitution."

When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., died in 1935, he left the bulk of his
estate to the United States Government.
This gift, known as the Oliver Wendell
Hnlmes Devise, sat in the Treasury for
about twenty years, until Congress set up
a Presidential Commission to determine
what to do with it. The principal use of
the money has been to fund a multivolume History of the United States
Supreme Court. The history of the
project itself has not always been a happy
one, for some of the authors have been
unable to complete their volumes.
Among them was one of my teachers,
the late Paul Freund, who was the first
general editor of the project and also
planned to write the volume on the
period in which Charles Evans Hughes
was Chief Justice, from 1930 to 1941.
1 have had the good fortune to receive the
succeeding assignment to write this
volume.

I feel fortunate to be part of the Devise
History not only because it places me in
a wonderful neighborhood of authors,
but also because it is a tremendously
important prosect; its period of gestation
has been very long. but so will be its
shelf-life. And I feel particularly fortunate
to have the Hughes Court assignment not
only because 1 have already spent
considerable time studying the Hughes
Court - In what seems like a prior life.
I \note a dissertation on Hughes as Chief
Justice - but also because of the
importance of the period. For the Court,
as for society at large, this was an era of
enormous turmoil and transformation.
Indeed, I believe it was "The Crucible of
the Modem Constitution." That, at any
rate, will be the subtitle of my ~ ~ o l u m e .
The period began with what has been
called the old constitutionalism still
apparently dominant, continued through
the crisis that culminated in the struggle
over Franklin Roosevelt's plan to pack
the Court in 1937, and ended as the
Justices appointed by Roosevelt consolidated their hold on the Court and on the
dramatically new constitutionalism that
still prevails.

So I have a story to tell and a mysten
to solve. The story is of how this transformation was achieved. And at the heart of
the s t o n lies this myster).: In the spring
of 1937, shortly after Roosevelt's landslide re-election victory and during the
height of the Court-packing battle, the
Court seemed suddenly to become more
liberal. To what extent, if any, did these
political factors account for this apparent
suitch? But implicit in this question, as
I have phrased it, is another: To what
extent was there actually a suitch?
At the broadest level, of course there
was: Constitutional law was far different
in 1941 from what it was in 1930.
Indeed, the old constitutionalism \\.as
effectively dead as soon as Roo~e\~elt's
appointees began to replace the conserative Four Horsemen in the fall of 1937.
Liberal decisions resulting from these
personnel changes do not represent a
response by the Court to political
pressure; the new Justices were part of
the victorious side of 1936, not its
cowered foes. But because these person-
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nel changes occufred so soon after the
Court-packing battle concluded, they
may make it harder to discern what the
Court's reaction to political pressure was.
Certainly, in the spring of 1937, while
the battle was hot, the Court issued a
flurry of significant decisions reaching
liberal results, far different from the
results of an earlier flurry of significant
decisions in 1936. The most important
cases break down into three sets, which
we may refer to as the minimum wage,
general welfare, and commerce clause
cases. In 1936, in Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, the Court held a state
minimum wage law invalid; but the next
year, in West Coast Hate2 Co. v. Panish,
the Court upheld such a law in overturning the precedent on which Morehead
was based. In 1936, in United States v.
Butler, the Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act had exceeded the
federal government's ~ o w eto
i tax and
spend, but in the Social Security Cases of
1937 the Court upheld the exercise of
those powers in the Social Securiry Act.
In 1936, in Carter v. Carter coal Co.,
the Court held invaw a Congressional
attempt under the commerce clause to
regulate labor relations in a basic productive industry, but in 1937, in NLRB v.
J a r s & hughlin Steel Corp., the Court

--

fipheld a f i r armore mveepIngzqyiatioa of
labor relations, a h under the cmmerae
power.
These developmentswere draznaic,
but we must be mti s in concluding
whether, or to whn &t, the 1937
decisions represented a &den adoption
of a new ideology. I b e l i e that.to
answer these questions q u i r e s a great
deal of attention to the grubby details of
individualJustices and individual cases.
It is tempting to think of the Court
organically, as an institution that moves '
and makes strategic decisions like an
army. Perhaps this model is an qppropriate portrayal of the Court when John
Marshall dominated it. But it does not
come close to reflecting the Court of early
1937. Obviously, the Court as a whole,
acting in conference, could not have been
a strategic decisionmaker; it was too
badly divided; There were blocs on the
court, four Justices on the right and three
an the left, that held informal caucuses at
which they presumably discussed tactics
for conference>.Buteven assurmng each
bloc remained cohesive (which was not
always so) neither could p r d in any
case without support tram the middle;
the conservative Four Horsemen needed
the vote of either Chief Justice Hugha ar
Owen Roberts, and the liberals needed
both their votes.
'

-

If there ivai a strategic decision&,
therefore, it would have had to be one elf
these two Justices*-me
h v e thought
that thiswas a role played by.Hughrs. He
was, after all, E e Chief Justice, he was a
commanding figure, ahd he itood
ideologically near the center of the Court.
But there is no basis for concluding that
he had strategic control over the Court,
and there is sound reasdn for concluding
that he did not. Indeed, Justice Brandeis
told Felix Frankurter at a crucial moment
that Hughes was depressed becauqe he
had no control over the Court. Before the
crisis, Hughes was in the dissent in too
many cases of political sigmf&nce to
suppose that he had any real measure of
control. Hughes.did not solicit his
colleagues for votes, and he seems to
have taken an austere view of his role and
the decisionmaking process of the Court:
The Justices each had their say in conference, they voted, and they moved on to
the next case.
Then how about Justice Roberts? He
was not in strategic control of the Court;
he controlled no one's vate but
own,
and he does not seem to have had
significant persuasive power over his
colleaeues. But certainly Roberts had a

great degree of control over the Court's
decisions, kcaw on many significaw
issues he was the man inthe-middle, the
Justice most likely to join the conservative fou~to-make a majority.
then, should not be
The
phrased as whether, or to what extent,
the ~ i u rwas
t affected by political
pressure. The key question ishvhether
' Justice Roberts was affected by political
pressure; a subsidiary question is
whether Chief Justice Hughes, who also
might be thought to have done some
switching in 1937,was so affected. To
adapt t e r n used by Graham Allison in
his celebzated study, Essmce of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, if we
want to anderstand the Court's course of
decisions, we are better off dealing not
within Model 11, treating the Court as a
monolithic entity, bur within Model 111,
emphasizing the roles of the individual
players.
1 emphasize this point not just out of
persnicketiness. It is important both for
understanding what tnppenbd in 1937
and for assessing its s@icance. First,
as to the assessment of significance:
Suppose that what I shall call the political
hypothesis -that political pfiu%e
explains the course. of decisions appears to be correct. It is probably far
more difficult to draw hhtorically
interesting genemlizations from the
proposition dmt -Roberts, or perhaps

1

Hughes and Roberts,rrspmded to
pblitical presmm than it would be to
draw such generalizations from the
propositian that the Court responded to
such pressure.
In understanding what happened,
phrasing the question in terms of the
C
O rather
~
than of Junice Roberts and
Chief Justice Hughes probably would
make little difference if we could reliably
think of decisions by the Court under
this model: Any issue is represented by a
point on a continuum runnikg [omLeft
to right, and the Justices by fixed links in
a rigid chain,running from left to right
with Roberts in the middle. If the chain
comes down with five ar more links to
the left of the critical point, then the
liberals win, and otherwise the conservatives win.
Now, this model does have some
explanatory power, because it rests
implicitly on two premises that are
usually true. First, judges tend to act
consistently on a given issue. Thus, if
Justice A is more conservative (whatever
that may mean) than Justice B on issue 1
on one occasion, chances are strong that,
absent samething unusual happening,
A will be more conservative than B on
issue 1 on another occasion. Second,
there is a substantial correlation between

certain issues. That is, if we know that A is
more conservative h , B on issue 1, we

may dbe able to predict how they will
stand in relation to one another on issue 2.
TZle trouble is that neither of these
premises is inevitably true -or anywhere close. Each Justice is subject to his
own set of influences, and they may
differ, in a multivariate way, from one
Justice to another. (The masculine
gender, by the hey, is appropriate for the
Court of the 1930s.) This means that the
Justices cannot be put on a simple
continuum. The problem for analysis is
in part, but not only, that a given justice
may be more liberal on some issues,
relative to his colleagues, than on other
issues. The more difficult aspect of the
problem is that any Justice, even one who
seems moderate on most issues, might be
affected to a substantial extent by a given
factor that seems far less imponant to his
colleagues. If one nevertheless knew with
confidence the full panoply of a given
Justice's views on matters coming before
the Court, then one d d test whether
hls votes and opinions consistently
reflected those views. But such confidence is, of course, difficult to attain.
To a large extent, a Justice's views are
revealed only through those votes and
opinions themselves. And this creates at
least three signifcant dfficulties.

Most obvious perhaps is a large
problem of circularity. Suppose that a
Justice votes on the conservative side of
Case 1 and on the liberal side of Case 2.
This does not necessarily mean that
anything strange happened, or that the
Justice must have responded to political
pressure between the two cases - even if
it so happens that a political event that
might be thought to have created leftward pressure occurred during that
internal. It might be that there is a
distinction between the two cases that
made the liberal side appear more
persuasive in Case 2 than in Case 1; to a
large extent, the business of appellate
judgng, and the method by which judgemade law grows, consists of distinguishing cases, invoking a given doctrine in
one case but not in another because of
material differences between the cases.
But if the political factor also provides a
plausible explanation for the pair of
votes, it may be difficult to know
whether this substantive distinction
between the two cases really was a
significant factor motivating the Justice's
conduct.
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The same points apply to sets of cases. Pusey characterized it, was: "Who knows
Suppose a Justice has a batch of conserwhat causes a judge to decide as he does?
vative votes in one time period and a
Maybe the breakfast he had has somebatch of liberal votes in a later time
thing to do with it." And it may well be
period. This might be because a political
that, in the case of Roberts especially, no
factor intervened, and some historians
matter how deeply and accurately we
seem to regard this inference - that the
may analyze the factors motivating a
Justice altered his ideological stance, at
Justice's decisions, we will be left with a
least temporarily - as inevitable. But it is residue of apparent randomness - a
not. Just as a fair coin will sometimes be
degree to which, though some consistent
flipped heads three times in a row and
set of factors might be at work, it will be
then tails three times in a row, a Justice
essentially impossible for us to recognize
acting conscientiously might decide a run what they are. There is a significant irony
of cases on one side of the line and then a here, I think: To the extent that such
second run on the other side.
factors as the Justice's breakfast help
Second, even putting aside political
explain conduct that might otherwise
factors, simply because creative lawyering appear inconsistent, a political explanacan expose a potentially material distinction is not necessary.
tion between two cases, it by no means
Finally, because of the group nature of
follows that this is a difference that
the Court's work, its opinions provide
only a limited insight into the beliefs of a
actually persuaded the individual Justice
in question. I have suggested that some
particular Justice. The Hughes Court was
factor that might appear relatively
sharply divided, of course, but as comunimportant to most Justices, or most
pared to the modern Court it was much
less fragmented; often there was a
observers, may appear critical to one
dissent, but in contrast to today cases in
Justice. If we are lucky, we may be able
which there were more than two opinto discern these, but I do not think we
ions were relatively rare. Ordinarily, a
always can. I find it very interesting that
in 1946, when Merlo Pusey, in the course Justice would go along with an opinion
of preparing his prize-winning biography that reached the result he favored,
without feeling the need to write sepaof Hughes, asked Roberts to account for
his conduct in the minimum wage cases,
Roberts' "initial, semifacetious reply", as
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believe that, notwithstanding these difficulties, Hughes'
judicial ideology can be mapped out in some detail. O n some
issues, he was very liberal: In the general area of civil rights
and civil liberties, I believe there was no member of the
Court more liberal. Nearly as strong a statement could be
made with respect to the question of the power of the state
to regulate prices, including wages, and to overcome
private contractual arrangements.

rately simply because he did not agree
with every statement contained in the
opinion. Thus, to a large extent a Justice
had two principal options in any given
case - to join the majority or to dissent
- and the Justice's vote does not in itself
give more information than which of
those two options he preferred; a Justice's
concurrence in an opinion did not
demonstrate that he agreed with it in its
entirety. Of course, the Justice's own
opinions are a better guide to his views,
but at times the author might be willing
to alter the text to make sure that he
retained the concurrence of his colleagues.
I believe that, notwithstanding these
difficulties, Hughes' judicial ide~lo~gy
can
be mapped out in some detail. On some
issues, he was very liberal: In the general
area of civil rights and civil liberties, I
believe there was no member of the
Court more liberal. Nearly as strong a
statement could be made with respect to
the question of the power of the state to
regulate prices, including wages, and to
overcome private contractual arrangements. (I put aside the troublesome
question of why ludicial activism is
generally considered liberal when what
are deemed to be civil rights or civil
liberties are at issue, but conservative
when asserted rights against state eco-

nomic power are at issue.) When the
reach of the federal government's po\vers
was at stake, he still tended to be liberal
- that is, hospitable to such power though more cautiously so. On many tas
matters, however, he was far more
conservative, sometimes voting to the
right of Justice Roberts, and he was
similarly consenTativewhen he believed
freedom of individual opportunity uTasat
stake. And certain issues seemed to
matter to him so much that they could
make him appear, in some contests, to be
one of the most conservative members of
the Court. More than any other Justice, it
seems, he was willing to put weight on
constitutional restrictions against delegation of legslative authority; Brandeis
reported that he nras "crazy" about
confiscation; and he had a distinctive,
highly judicialized lieu. of proper
administration.

Furthermore, I believe that, with an
understanding of Hughes' views, we can
state uith a rather high degree of confidence that his votes were not affected by
political factors, either the public reaction
to the Court's decisions, or the Roose~relt
landslide of 1936, or the Court-packing
battle. I have presented a rather full
arpment else\vhere, in an article entitled
S~ritcl~iltg
Timc and 0 t h ~ TI~ougJzt
~E~pcrimcnts:T k H~rghcsCourt and
Constitutional T~~ansfonnation,
142 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 189 1 (199-t), and will summarize
it briefly here.
Any case for a snitch must be based
primarily on the three sets of cases I have
described above - the minimum wage,
general welfare, and commerce clause
cases. Hughes clearly did not snitch in
the minimum wage cases; he had been in
the liberal minority in MOT-cltcad
in 1936,
and the views that he established as law
in \Arcst Coast Hotcl case in 1937 were
ones that he had long espoused. Nor was
there a substantive switch for Hughes in
the "general welfare" cases. In Butlcl- in
1936, he had voted against the particular
esercise of the Government's tasing and

spending power there at issue, an aspect
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that
appeared coercive to him. But he clearly
favored the expansive general statement
of the Government's power in Roberts'
opinion for the majority; this, too,
echoed a view that he had long held.
Indeed, Roberts later told Felix Frankfurter that he had included that dictum
"just to please the Chief." In the Social
Security Cases of 1937, Hughes favored
the exercise of the spending power but these were much stronger cases for
the Government, and so they appeared
not only to Hughes and Roberts but also
to two of the four conservative Justices,
Van Devanter and Sutherland.
As for the commerce clause cases, it
appears to me that Hughes' opinion for a
bare majority of the Court inJones C
Laughlin in 1937 is not genuinely consistent with the commerce aspect of his
separate opinion the previous year in
Carter, at least not according to any
reasoning that commanded Hughes'
conscientious adherence. But it is Carter,
not Jones G Laughlin, that is the aberra-

tion. The discussion of the commerce
power inJones G LaughIin is written in
Hughes' most magmerial and expansive
style, and it is consistent with the entire
sweep of his career, going back to his
days as an Associate Justice. The commerce passage in Hughes' Carter opinion,
by contrast, is brief, conclusory, and
cryptic, and unnecessary given the way
he would have resolved the case. I
suspect it did not represent his genuine
views, and that he inserted it for some
political motive. His commerce discussion in Carter ended with what was in
effect a plea to the public to get off the
backs of the Court, amending the
Constitution if the Court's interpretation
of the commerce power seemed intolerable; this advertisement, I believe, may
have provided the motivation for Hughes'
skimpy substantive discussion, rather
than vice versa. In any event, there is no
basis for concluding that Hughes was
pushed into Jones G Laughlin by
political pressure.

As for Roberts, I can not speak with
nearly so much confidence. This is in
part because I have not spent as much
time studylng Roberts. But it is also, I
suspect, because to a certain extent
Roberts defies understanding. His views
were not as well settled as Hughes', and
they appear to have been considerably
more idiosyncratic. Thus, his views seem
to have changed over time, and even
without a significant passage of time he
acted in ways that would appear to most
observers as inconsistent; inconsistency
in the eyes of others, however, might
mean simply that Roberts was motivated
by factors that appeared more important
to him than to others.
I do have some conclusions, which I
have explored more fully in the Switching
Time article, regarding Roberts and the
political hypothesis. Roberts' conduct in
the minimum wage cases was strange,
and his later explanation of it does not
fully hold up. He joined the conservatives
in Morehead and the liberals in West Coast
Hotel, and later asserted that he did so
because in the latter case, but not the
former, the question of whether to
overrule the precedent that most strongly

\upported the conscnratlves was not
I~rcsentcclThis IS not so, at lc'lst argu,11~1\~, [lint clucstlnn was actually presented
~-i;o~-e
c1ca1-lyby counscl In Morchcad But
I [hlnk that ~t IS a1 least clear that Roberts'
\otc In \\'N Coact Hotc'l, and not the one
In ,!/lor t-hcncl, reflected h ~ pre\r~ously
s
c\prcsscd substant~veirlews Why he was
i o much readier In Wcct Coact Hotcl to
ojVcrcomeany proceclurnl scruples that
Iind prevented hlm from jolnlng the
Ilberals In Morchcad IS not SO clear He
Inny have dec~dedthat he was wrong on
~hlsmatter, or that the conservat~veshad
['ken advantage of hlm And he may
11we been shaken by the furlous publlc
rc'xctlon to Morcllcad. But the tlmlng of
the Court's act~onsIn \Vcct Coast Hotcl,
among other factors, suggests that nelther
the 1936 electlon nor the Court-packlng
battle had anythlng to do wlth the
matter
Roberts' votes In the "general welfare"
cases can probably be esplalned In the
same way that Hughes', as well as those
of Van Devanter and Sutherland, can the Soc~alSecunty Cases appeared to be
stronger ones for the Government than
Butlcr d ~ dRoberts appears to have been
slgnlhcantly less enthused about the
federal spendlng power than Hushes
was, el-en at the tlme Roberts wrote
broadl). about ~t In Butler, and on the
commerce clause hls record on the Court
before 1937 was far more consenratlve
than Hughes' The most notable, but not
the only lllustratlon of t h ~ 1s
s Roberts'
concurrence wlth the majonty In Car-tcr.
I am ~nclined,therefore, to belleve that
Roberts' concurrence with the liberal stde
of the Court ~n]orlcsG Latcghl~nrepresented a break lor hlm But there 1s no
s
Roberts was
reason to doubt ~ t slncenty,
capable of changing h ~ mlnd
s
on short
order, h ~ ButIcr
s
op~nlonsuggests that he
was then beglnnlng to expand 111s llews of
nat~onalpowers, and hls later conduct

showed no resenations about Jorles &+
L n u ~ h l i nApart
.
from the timing, there is no
reason to believe that the Court-packing
plan influenced Rohens, and there is good
reason to believe it did not: It was not
immediately clear what the political impact
of upholding the National Labor Relations
Act would be, and the Government's
victory was far more sweeping that one
might cspect if the decision was inconsistent with Roberts' conscientious beliefs but
motivated by a manipulative desire to help
defeat Court-packing. Perhaps the storm of
sitdown strikes then compelling national
attention made Roberts belie1.e that a
national solution to labor problems was
necessary, but I do not believe it is possible
to be sure.
I have said that I aim to tell a story,
but 1 have not promised that it would be
a simple, neat story. I t \till not satisfy
those who wish to \riew the Court as an
ordinary political institution, subject to
ordinary political pressures. Nor \$ill it
gratify those ~ v h oare committed to the
view that no Justice could have been
affected by such pressures. And it may
discomfit those who ~irouldlike to draw
conclusions about the Court of the
Hughes era without doing the hard \trork
of esamining the particulars of the cases
it decided, and tning to do so with the
mindset of the individuals who happened
to constitute the Court. But I hope that it
will yield us a fuller picture than we now
have of how it happened that the Hughes
Court transformed American constitutional lalv.
k
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Professor R~chardFiicdmnti jo1 ncd
thcfacultv in 1988. His rcscarch
focuses on olldcnce, antitnlst,
and Supremc Court history.
He is gencral editor nf The New
W~gmore.n m~tlti-\*oIumctr-catisc
on o~idcnceno\v in preparation.

